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Abstract. The No Free Lunch (NFL) theorem for search and optimisa-
tion states that averaged across all possible objective functions on a fixed
search space, all search algorithms perform equally well. Several refined
versions of the theorem find a similar outcome when averaging across
smaller sets of functions. This paper argues that NFL results continue
to be misunderstood by many researchers, and addresses this issue in
several ways. Existing arguments against real-world implications of NFL
results are collected and re-stated for accessibility, and new ones are
added. Specific misunderstandings extant in the literature are identified,
with speculation as to how they may have arisen. This paper presents
an argument against a common paraphrase of NFL findings – that al-
gorithms must be specialised to problem domains in order to do well –
after problematising the usually undefined term “domain”. It provides
novel concrete counter-examples illustrating cases where NFL theorems
do not apply. In conclusion it offers a novel view of the real meaning of
NFL, incorporating the anthropic principle and justifying the position
that in many common situations researchers can ignore NFL.
1 Introduction
The “No Free Lunch” (NFL) theorems for search and optimisation are a set of
limiting results, stating that all black-box search and optimisation algorithms
have equal performance, averaged across all possible objective functions on a
fixed search space.
NFL is famous: the 1995 technical report and the 1997 journal article which
introduced the original results [1, 2] have between them been cited over 7000
times, according to Google Scholar1, with 3000 of these since 2013. They caused
considerable controversy when first published, and continue to divide opinion.
Some authors regard them as very important limiting results, the equivalent
of Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem for search and optimisation [3]. Others re-
gard them as trivial [4, 5] or unimportant in practice [6]. Still others, includ-
ing Wolpert and Macready themselves, argue that the practical importance of
0 This work was published in Springer Metaheuristics 2019 DOI 10.1007/s42257-019-
00002-6: this journal is now discontinued.
1 http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=’no+free+lunch’+wolpert+macready, 20
February 2018.
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2 James McDermott
NFL is the implication that success in metaheuristics requires matching the algo-
rithm to the problem. Those who argue that NFL is unimportant in practice do
not dispute the results per se. Many refinements have been added to the original
theorem, generally in the direction of “sharpening” it, i.e. proving new situations
where NFL-like results hold. In this paper, we will use the term “the original
NFL” to refer to the original theorem [1, 2], and “NFL” to refer collectively to
the original and refinements.
Proving NFL results requires some mathematics, but an understanding of the
theorems is not difficult. In fact, a simple paraphrase is sufficient for discussion
purposes, but it must be the right paraphrase. Misinterpretations are common,
both in the academic literature and in technical discussion in blogs and web
forums. Some misinterpretattions will be examined in detail in later sections. Of
course, correct interpretations of NFL research are routinely given by researchers
who write specifically about the topic (as opposed to those who mention NFL
in the course of other work). However, the literature tends not to directly take
on and expose the source of misunderstandings, nor provide concrete guidance.
Therefore, this paper is aimed firstly at researchers who are left in doubt
by the existing NFL literature. It is intended to be a “one-stop shop”. It ar-
gues broadly for the position that metaheuristics researchers can ignore NFL
in many common situations. Rather than requiring researchers to state specific,
per-problem assumptions to escape NFL, or specialise their algorithms to spe-
cific problem sets, it argues that existing algorithms may already be specialised
to an appropriate problem set, and provides a single assumption which is well-
justified and sufficient to escape NFL for practical situations. Overall the paper
is not focussed on new research results, but rather a combination of an accessi-
ble review with interpretation of results and consequences, new results2, and a
conclusion which it is hoped is useful in practice.
Section 2 summarises the NFL literature, concluding that the strongest ver-
sions of NFL do not have stronger practical implications than more well-known
older versions. Section 3 describes many common NFL misunderstandings, and
in particular argues that existing, generic algorithms are already specialised to
an appropriate subset of problems, potentially escaping NFL. The next two sec-
tions provide specific assumptions which allow researchers to “escape” NFL in
practice (Section 4) and concrete counter-examples (Section 5). But Section 6
goes further to explain why, based on the anthropic principle, researchers can in
many situations ignore NFL without making specific, per-problem assumptions.
Section 7 notes that common “rules of thumb” about metaheuristic performance
may remain true even though NFL does not support them, and summarises by
stating when and why metaheuristics researchers can ignore NFL.
2 A statement of practical consequences of more recent NFL variants; several cor-
rections of NFL misunderstandings; problematising the term “problem domain”;
argument that existing generic algorithms are already specialised; fitness distance
correlation and modularity as escapes from NFL; concrete NFL counter-examples
in several domains; and introduction of the anthropic principle as a justification for
the position that in many common situations researchers can ignore NFL.
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2 Review
In many fields of research, a certain type of limiting result is sometimes given the
nickname “no free lunch”. There are two strands of NFL research of interest here:
NFL for search and optimisation [1, 2], the main topic of this paper, and NFL
for supervised machine learning [7], which will be briefly discussed in Section 6
and Section 7. NFL results in other fields such as reinforcement learning, physics
or biology are not treated in this paper.
In this section we review the original NFL for search and optimisation and
several refinements, mostly in chronological order, discuss the biggest contribu-
tions of NFL research, and then summarise. We remark that several good reviews
of the NFL literature have been presented elsewhere, including those by Corne
and Knowles [8], Whitley and Watson [9], Joyce and Herrmann [10].
2.1 NFL for search and optimisation
The (original) NFL theorem for search and optimisation [1, 2] states that the
performance of any two deterministic non-repeating black-box search algorithms
is equal, regardless of the performance measure, when averaged across all possible
objective functions on a given search space. That is:∑
f∈F
P (dym|f,m, a1) =
∑
f∈F
P (dym|f,m, a2)
where a1, a2 are search algorithms, F is the set of all possible functions on a
given search space, P is a performance measure, and dym is a trace, i.e. the
history of objective function values of individuals visited by the algorithm in its
first m steps. A performance measure is a single number reflecting how well an
algorithm has done, given a set of objective function values: for example, “best
ever objective value” is a performance measure, and “mean objective value of the
trace” is another. Finally, a search algorithm is a procedure which chooses which
point in a search space to visit next, given a trace. “Black-box” means that the
algorithm is given only a trace. It cannot “see inside” the objective function,
e.g. by using its gradient. Such algorithms include genetic algorithms, simulated
annealing, particle swarm optimisation, and many other metaheuristics.
The original NFL results are stated for deterministic algorithms, but the
stochastic case reduces immediately to the deterministic case and the difference
is never crucial [2, 10]. NFL results are often stated for non-repeating algorithms
(a repeating algorithm can be systematically worse than random search because
it wastes time [11]), but again this point is not important in discussion of NFL,
since any repeating algorithm can be made non-repeating with memoisation [12].
An immediate corollary of NFL is that the performance of every algorithm is
equal to that of random search. Better than random performance on some func-
tions is balanced by worse than random on others. As Koppen et al. [13] write,
“all attempts to claim universal applicability of any algorithm must be fruitless”.
Oltean [14] argued that “these breakthrough theories should have produced dra-
matic changes” in the field. However, Wolpert and Macready [2], Radcliffe and
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Surry [15], Wolpert [16] and others discouraged “nihilistic” interpretations, in-
stead arguing that the true meaning of NFL is that an algorithm should be
tailored to the problem in order to achieve better than random performance.
Other researchers, while accepting NFL as stated, argued that NFL can be
dismissed because the scenario presented – wishing to optimise all possible func-
tions – is not realistic [17]. Hutter [6] goes so far as to call NFL a “myth” with
little practical implication, explaining that “we usually do not care about the
maximum of white noise functions, but functions that appear in real-world prob-
lems”. Hutter is making a distinction between problems we care about and ones
we do not. In the context of machine learning, Bengio and LeCun [18] similarly
define the “AI-set” as “the set of all the tasks that an intelligent agent should
be able to learn”. In the same way, we will use the term “problems of interest”
to refer to optimisation problems which we would like to be able to solve using
optimisation algorithms. This definition, like those of Hutter and Bengio and
LeCun, is informal but sufficient for discussion. A first question for any NFL
investigation is then whether the set of problems of interest on a given search
space is equal to the set of all possible functions on that space, since if not, the
original NFL will not apply. A fundamental objection to NFL is that the set
of all possible functions is enormous, and contains many “unnatural” functions
which would never arise in real problems (e.g. Droste et al. [17]). However, we
next consider a variant of NFL which applies to a much smaller set.
2.2 Sharpened NFL
The “sharpened” NFL (SNFL) theorem [19] can be seen as a response to Droste
et al. [17], because it states that equal performance of algorithms holds over
a much smaller set than “all possible objective functions”, which Droste et al.
[17] had argued was unrealistic. The statement of SNFL is the same as that of
NFL, except that now performance is averaged across any set of objective func-
tions which is closed under permutation (CUP). A CUP set is a set of objective
functions which differ from each other only by permuting the objective function
values – i.e. under any function in the set of functions, the same objective values
are allocated, but to different points of the search space. Thus, given a search
space, a CUP set is characterised by a multi-set of objective values. Such a set is
called CUP because permutation does not result in a new function outside the
set. For example, if f assigns a unique value to each point x ∈ X, then there are
|X|! functions in the CUP set of f . For another example, consider the Onemax
problem on bitstrings of length n: f(x) =
∑n
i xi, and f is to be maximised.
There is just one point x′ = (0, 0, . . . , 0) which has f(x′) = 0 and is the worst
point in the space. Any function f ′ in the CUP set of f must also award an
objective value f ′(x′′) = 0 to one and only one point x′′ in the space (not neces-
sarily the same one). If there are multiple points with an objective value f ′ = 0,
then f ′ is not in the CUP set.
The set of all possible functions can be partitioned into CUP sets – the CUP
sets are disjoint and collectively exhaustive. SNFL holds over each CUP set, so
NFL can be derived as an immediate corollary of SNFL.
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Although SNFL is “sharper” than NFL, in practice this sharpness also gives
researchers an easier way to “escape” NFL. Because SNFL is “if and only if”
(the set of problems is CUP if and only if average performance for all algorithms
is equal), a proof that the set of problems of interest is not CUP is sufficient to
escape SNFL and thus also escape the original NFL.
With this in mind, Igel and Toussaint [20] asked: “are the preconditions of the
NFL-theorems ever fulfilled in practice? How likely is it that a randomly chosen
subset is [CUP]?” The implicit assumption here is that our set of problems of
interest will be drawn uniformly from all subsets, and according to the authors,
the number of CUP subsets “can be neglected compared to the total number of
possible subsets”, and thus SNFL is unlikely to apply to our set of problems of
interest. However, as Whitley and Watson [9] state, “the a priori probability of
any subset of problems is vanishingly small – including any set of applications
we might wish to consider”. It thus falls into much the same trap as NFL itself –
there are many possible subsets, but most subsets are rather “unnatural”. There
is no reason to think that the problems of interest are drawn uniformly in this
way. Rowe et al. [21] argue that using the language of probability in this way is
indeed misleading.
However, other researchers did indeed take advantage of the “if and only if”
nature of SNFL. Igel and Toussaint [22], Koehler [23] and others demonstrated
that common problem types, such as TSP, are not CUP, and hence on these
neither NFL nor SNFL constrains algorithm performance.
Wegener [24] also stated that the SNFL scenario is not realistic: “We never
optimize a function without: a polynomial-time evaluation algorithm (a, f) →
f(a); a short description; structure on the search space”. Whether the evaluation
algorithm is polynomial-time is irrelevant in contexts where the search space is
of fixed size, but the broader point stands: CUP sets may include many functions
which require more than polynomial time to evaluate, or a long description (e.g.,
no shorter than the table of objective function values), which is equivalent to
there being no structure on the search space. The conclusion is that the set of
functions of realistic interest will never form a CUP set, and hence algorithms
are free to out-perform random search on them. Although some aspects of this
conclusion were later questioned (see Section 4.7), as a whole it probably stands
as the settled position of many researchers. Wegener considered this to be the
last word: “The NFL theorem is fundamental and everything has been said on
it [. . . ] It is time to stop the discussion”. However, more was to come: firstly in
the form of NFL refinements, and secondly in misunderstandings of NFL results
which prevent the discussion from being closed.
2.3 Non-uniform NFL
Igel and Toussaint [20] argued that a simple averaging of performance across
all functions on the space (as envisaged in NFL), or the CUP set (as in SNFL)
is not relevant, since in practice problems may be encountered according to a
non-uniform probability distribution.
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Previous to this, the idea that we “care” only about some of the possible
problems on a search space, and regard others as unimportant, was treated as an
all-or-nothing proposition: for each problem, we either care about it or we do not.
It was also a route to avoiding NFL, since when only a subset of functions are of
interest, an algorithm is free to out-perform random search. Using a non-uniform
distribution generalises this idea, so that we may say we care about different
problems to different degrees, weighting them according to a distribution. The
non-uniform NFL theorem (NUNFL) theorem proved independently by Streeter
[25], Igel and Toussaint [20], English [26] and (according to English [27]) Neil and
Woodward [28] clarifies the implications. According to NUNFL, all algorithms
perform the same when taking their weighted mean performance over any set
of functions F , where weighting is according to some probability distribution, if
and only if the distribution is constant on any CUP set within F , also known as
a “block-uniform” probability distributions on problems.
This result does not greatly change the overall NFL picture. Just as before,
if we can show or assume that in a given CUP set, some functions are of interest
and some are not, then the probability distribution is not constant on that set
(not block-uniform), and so no NFL, SNFL or NUNFL result holds. SNFL can
be seen as a corollary of NUNFL.
As discussed above, Igel and Toussaint [20] argued that the probability of a
set (e.g., the set of problems of interest) being CUP is vanishingly small, but went
on to discard this argument. However, they use a very similar argument in the
context of NUNFL: “The probability that a randomly chosen distribution over
the set of objective functions fulfills the preconditions of [NUNFL] has measure
zero. This means that in this general and realistic scenario the probability that
the conditions for a NFL-result hold vanishes.” In fact, this scenario is still not
realistic, for much the same reasons: our distribution over problems is not chosen
uniformly from all possible distributions.
2.4 Focussed NFL and restricted metric NFL
Whitley and Rowe [29] further refined NFL to produce “focussed” NFL (FNFL).
Where SNFL states that all algorithms perform equally on a CUP set, FNFL
states that for any given subset of algorithms there is a closure set of functions
(possibly much smaller than the CUP set) over which the algorithms perform
equally. This new closure set, called the “focus set”, is derived from the orbits
(components) of permutations representing the behaviour of the given algorithms
on any function. The most extreme example discussed by the authors concerns
just a pair of algorithms (A1, A2) and a single function f1. Running A1 on f1
gives a trace T . Using permutations representing f1 and T , we can construct a
function f2 such that running A2 on f2 will give the same trace T , so the focus
set is {f1, f2}. With identical traces, any performance measure will be identical.
In the example, both f1 and f2 are “toy problems”, not of practical interest.
Joyce and Herrmann [10] went on to produce a yet sharper result, the re-
stricted metric NFL (RMNFL). Again we start with a restricted set of algorithms
and of functions, but now also a restricted set of performance metrics. Given a
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set of functions β, RMNFL tells us that there exists a “restricted set” on which
all of the considered algorithms have equivalent performance according to the
considered performance metrics, and this restricted set is a subset (and may be
a proper subset) of the focus set. Again the example considers “toy problems”.
One useful strategy for understanding the practical implications of NFL re-
sults is to consider the performance of our favourite algorithm A in comparison
with that of random search (RS). The original NFL theorem and several refine-
ments SNFL, FNFL and RMNFL then all lead to similar-sounding remarks: for
a fixed search space, if A out-performs RS averaged over a set of problems β
then there exists a set of problems S such that β ⊂ S and RS out-performs A on
the remainder S − β. It’s important to realize that “RS out-performs A on the
remainder” does not necessarily mean that RS out-performs A on every single
problem in S − β, but rather that it out-performs A averaged over S − β. It
may be that RS out-performs A on another subset β′, and they have equivalent
performance on S − β − β′, as illustrated in Fig. 1 (left).
=
β
β'
S=F
=
S=CUP(β)
β
β'
S=R
_
+
=β
β'
++
_
_
Fig. 1: Schematic representing performance of an algorithm A relative to random
search. Left: by the original NFL, if performance of A over set β of objective func-
tions on a fixed search space is better than random (+), then it is worse than random
on the remainder, which may be composed of a fraction β′ where it is truly worse than
random (-) and a fraction F − β − β′ where it is equivalent to random (=). Centre:
choosing a new β, by SNFL, the same is true over a CUP set. Right: choosing a new β,
by RMNFL, the same is true over the “restricted” set. The existence of problems on
which RS out-performs A is already guaranteed by SNFL. We can think of RMNFL as
zooming-in on SNFL, and SNFL as zooming-in on the original NFL. Although RMNFL
is stronger than SNFL, the practical implications seem the same.
The difference between NFL and the various refinements is the identity of
S, as shown in Fig. 1. In NFL, S = F , the set of all possible problems on
the search space. In SNFL, S = CUP(β), the CUP set. In FNFL, S = Φ,
where Φ is the “focus set” constructed with reference to our set of algorithms
(A and RS), and Φ ⊆ CUP(β). In RMNFL, S = R, where R is the “restricted
set” constructed with reference both to the set of algorithms and the choice of
performance metrics, and now R ⊆ Φ (and it may be that R = Φ). Overall, then:
β ⊂ R ⊆ Φ ⊆ CUP(β) ⊂ F
8 James McDermott
Informally, it is useful to think of three types of objective function on any
search space. “Nice” functions give “the right hints” [12] to the algorithm. There
are also deceptive ones, which have similar types of structure but give misleading
hints. Finally there are the random functions, which have effectively no structure
and are by far the most numerous. Thus, in Fig. 1 (left and centre), the sets
marked + and - are very small relative to that marked =.
The sets R and Φ can be much smaller than CUP(β) which is itself usually
far smaller than F , and so an intuitive argument researchers may use to “es-
cape” NFL and SNFL (“the set of problems considered by NFL or SNFL is so
huge that it likely contains some pathological problems which are unimportant in
practice”) cannot apply to escape FNFL or RMNFL. However, the practical im-
plications are the same: FNFL and RMNFL guarantee the existence of problems
where RS out-performs A, and we already knew this from SNFL. These problems
can only be a subset of the ones already identified by SNFL. FNFL and RMNFL
don’t show that these problems (where RS out-performs A) are of interest. They
may provide a mechanism by which researchers could in principle show this, but
this has not been done for any example yet, to our knowledge. Thus, researchers
can escape FNFL and RMNFL by the same assumption as they escape NFL
and SNFL [6]: there are problems where A performs worse than RS, but it is
assumed that they are not of interest. The practical implications of FNFL and
RMNFL are no stronger than those of SNFL.
Moreover, even where a focus set or restricted set exists as a proper subset of
the set of problems of interest to a researcher, if that set of problems of interest
is not CUP, then SNFL still applies in the “and only if” direction: algorithm A
can out-perform RS on it.
2.5 NFL in the continuum
Another relatively recent development is the application of NFL theory in con-
tinuous search spaces, in contrast to the discrete spaces considered in most NFL
literature. Auger and Teytaud [30] claim that NFL does not hold in continuous
spaces, but Rowe et al. [21] argue that this result occurs only because of an in-
correct framing of the problem in probabilistic language which generalises with
difficulty to the continuum. Rowe et al. show that an NFL-like result does indeed
hold. Alabert et al. [31] agree with and build on Auger and Teytaud, without
citing Rowe et al.. We will not enter into this debate, partly because in practice
metaheuristic algorithms do run in an effectively discrete setting [10].
2.6 Reinterpreting and re-proving NFL
Several authors have given re-interpretations of NFL which are perhaps more
intuitive than the original.
Culberson [32] remarks that choosing an objective function f uniformly is
equivalent to choosing each objective value f(x) uniformly from the objective
set (e.g. a subset of R) at the point in time when the algorithm first chooses
to visit x. With this “adversarial” view, it perhaps becomes easier to intuit just
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how hopeless black-box search is over “all possible fitness functions”. Ha¨ggstro¨m
[4] also uses this type of reasoning to give a good phrasing of NFL. Serafino [33]
states a “no induction form” of NFL: with no prior knowledge on the objective
function, each objective function value provides no information on any other
point in the search space. Woodward and Neil [34] point out that by NFL-like
reasoning, every algorithm will visit the optimum last on some function. Culber-
son makes his point in relation to the original formulation of NFL, but the same
reasoning can be applied to the SNFL formulation: choosing a objective func-
tion f uniformly from the CUP set is equivalent to choosing each objective value
f(x) uniformly from those so far unused in the multiset. Joyce and Herrmann
[10] improve on this reasoning to give a new approach to proving NFL results.
It uses the trace tree representation of search algorithms, introduced by English
[27]. In the trace tree, each node is labelled with the “trace so far” (traversing
from the root), and it branches each time the algorithm observes an objective
value and makes a decision about which point to visit next. A simple counting
argument given by Joyce and Herrmann [10] shows that on a fixed search space,
all algorithms produce the same set of traces.
Rowe et al. [21] “reinterpret” NFL focussing on symmetry results rather
than applications, and removing the language of probability which they argue is
inappropriate. As they point out, it is part of a general trend in NFL thinking,
also present in works by English [27], Due´n˜ez Guzma´n and Vose [35], Joyce and
Herrmann [10] and others, towards abstraction, duality between algorithms and
functions, and use of permutations and eventually group actions to represent
behaviour.
2.7 Special situations
There are several special situations where NFL results do not apply.
In multi-objective optimisation (MOO), the objective function is vector-
valued, e.g. both maximising the strength and minimising the weight of an engi-
neering design. NFL applies to such scenarios. However, Corne and Knowles [8]
remark that in MOO it is common to use comparative performance measures,
i.e. measures where we never consider the performance of an algorithm, but
only the performance of one relative to another. This prevents an NFL result
because although (as reasoned in SNFL) every possible trace will occur as the
trace of every algorithm on some problem, a given pair of traces generated by
two algorithms may not occur by any other pair of algorithms for any problems.
In coevolution, the objective function of an individual in the population is
defined through a contest between it and others. If a search algorithm allows
the “champion” individual to contest only against very weak antagonists then it
is wasting time, in a way somewhat analogous to a repeating algorithm, and so
can be systematically worse than random search [36].
In hyper-heuristics, the idea is to use a metaheuristic to search for a heuris-
tic suitable to a problem or set of problems. In typical hyper-heuristic scenarios,
the set of problems on which the heuristic is evaluated must be small, in order
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for search to be practical, and in particular small relative to the number of possi-
ble objective function values in a typical scenario. Poli and Graff [11] argue that
therefore the higher-level problem (from the point of view of the hyper-heuristic)
cannot be CUP, so SNFL does not apply.
These cases will not be considered further here.
2.8 The contributions of NFL
Although we will argue that researchers are in most situations justified in ignor-
ing NFL, it has made important contributions to the field of metaheuristics.
The first contribution is that NFL corrects a vague intuition which was per-
haps common prior to NFL, illustrated in Fig. 2. It purports to show that while
a specialised algorithm can be the best on the problems it is specialised to, a
“robust” algorithm such as a genetic algorithm can hope to be better than ran-
dom search on all problems. If this “all” is taken literally, then this is incorrect
and nowadays researchers making such claims would be marked as cranks. NFL
is thus the equivalent of the proof in physics of no perpetual motion machines.
Efficiency
Robust algorithm
Random search
Specialised algorithm
Problem type
Fig. 2: An incorrect intuition on algorithm performance (adapted from Goldberg [37])
A related benefit of NFL is that it reminds us to be careful, when making
statements of the form “algorithm A out-performs algorithm B”, to specify what
set of problems we are considering. For “all possible problems” or “all problems
in a CUP set”, or a focus set or restricted set, the statement is false; for “all
problems of interest” the statement is an almost incredibly strong claim, but not
disallowed by NFL; and so most such statements should be for sets identified
in other ways. Whenever an algorithm A out-performs random search on a set
of problems, it is because A is specialised to the set of problems, and NFL
encourages us to identify this specialisation, as discussed in Section 4.
Finally, NFL results have stimulated a greatly improved understanding of
search algorithms. This includes symmetry results and a view of algorithms
and problems as permutations and eventually as group actions [21]; a view of
algorithm behaviour through the lens of decision trees [27, 10]; and an important
connection between NFL and Bayesian optimisation. After observing a (partial)
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trace of objective function values, an optimisation algorithm is in a position to
update its prior on the location of the optimum. But in order to do so it requires
also a prior on the distribution of objective functions [33].
2.9 Summary
The original NFL and its variants seem never to have been applied to demon-
strate a limit on performance in practice. It is more common to respond to NFL
by exhibiting functions (typically, pathological ones on which our algorithm will
do badly) and claim that we do not care about performance on them, and thus
performance on problems we do care about is free to be better than random.
One example is [6], referring to “white noise functions”. With SNFL, discussion
often hinges on taking a set of problems on a given search space, and asking
whether it is CUP or not. This means asking whether any permutation of objec-
tive values of a function in that set will result in a new function in the same set.
Importantly, SNFL is an “if and only if” result. It is common to show that some
set of problems of interest is not CUP, so at least according to SNFL algorithms
are free to perform differently: examples include [22, 23, 38, 11], as discussed
in detail in Section 4. The secondary literature has not yet attempted to make
sense of the practical implications of FNFL and RNFL.
3 Misunderstanding NFL
Woodward and Neil [34], Sewell and Shawe-Taylor [39] both state that NFL is of-
ten misunderstood; Wolpert [16] writes that much research has arguably “missed
the most important implications of the theorems”. In this section, several actual
and potential misinterpretations will be presented. We can begin by noting that
the colloquial sense of the phrase “no free lunch” should not be confused with
the technical sense, as done e.g. by Lipson [40].
3.1 Going beyond a single search space or problem size
If we observe good performance of a given algorithm on several problems from
a given problem domain (e.g. TSP), then a natural response, given the overall
thrust of NFL, is to expect bad performance on another domain (e.g. symbolic
regression). However, since the search space for symbolic regression is different
from that for TSP, NFL gives no indication of performance on it.
Similarly, it may be natural to think that, given an observation of an algo-
rithm performing well on some problem sizes, it will necessarily perform badly
on other problem sizes. For example, Watson et al. [41] find that better-than-
random performance on several synthetic problems fails to transfer to real-world
problems, and introduce NFL to discuss the reasons why. This is inappropriate
since their synthetic and real-world problems have different sizes, hence differ-
ent search spaces. In practice there may often be reasons to believe that good
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performance on a problem of a given size tends to indicate good performance on
the same problem at a different size. These reasons are independent of NFL.
It might be countered that we can define a single large search space to include
embeddings of multiple search spaces, with different sizes of each, and that NFL
would apply to this space. This is correct: however, our algorithm does not run
on this space. This argument constrains the performance only of algorithms
designed to run on that space.
These misunderstandings may arise from a bad paraphrase of the original
NFL, along the lines of “you can’t win on all problems”. It’s important to include
“. . . on a fixed search space”.
3.2 Superfluous references
As Koppen et al. [13] remark, as a reaction to the original NFL, many references
“were put into the introductory parts of conference papers”. Perhaps many re-
searchers take the view that claims about overall algorithm performance could
be criticised by a reviewer citing NFL, so it is safer to put in a pre-emptive,
defensive NFL reference. Such statements are not incorrect, but are often su-
perfluous. An example is chosen arbitrarily from a highly-cited paper in a top
journal: “Simulation results showed that CRO is very competitive with the few
existing successful metaheuristics, having outperformed them in some cases, and
CRO achieved the best performance in the real-world problem. Moreover, with
the No-Free-Lunch theorem, CRO must have equal performance as the others
on average, but it can outperform all other metaheuristics when matched to
the right problem type” [42]. The behaviour is damaging when the algorithm
in question is of the type criticised by So¨rensen [43] and Weyland [44] – algo-
rithms of dubious novelty disguised by far-fetched nature-inspired metaphors.
Sometimes the authors of such algorithms cite NFL superfluously, perhaps as a
show of respectability, e.g. [45, 46, 47], and [48, p. 19]. It is not only authors
who are at fault here: they may be correct in guessing that reviewers will make
spurious references to NFL, so the behaviour is incentivised.
3.3 False intuition concerning the size of NFL-relevant sets
By the original NFL all algorithms have equal performance over the set F of all
possible functions f on a fixed search space X. It is easy to underestimate just
how large F is. The same applies to “all functions in a CUP set” in SNFL.
For example, if we are working on genetic programming (GP) symbolic re-
gression [49], the phrase “all possible functions” will naturally bring to mind
“all possible regression problems”, perhaps represented by a phrase like “all
possible training sets”. But this set is not the same as “all possible problems
on the regression search space”, which includes many problems which are not
regression problems for any dataset. NFL does not apply to the far smaller and
better-behaved set of all symbolic regression problems (see Section 5.3).
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Similarly, when discussing TSP problems, which are defined on a search space
itself consisting of permutations, it is easy to confuse “all TSPs” with “all prob-
lems on the permutation search space” or “all problems in the CUP set of a
TSP”. These are not the same. Woodward and Neil [34] write: “From a given
scenario [i.e. a TSP instance] other problems can be generated simply by re-
labelling the cities. If there are n cities, there are n! ways of re-labelling these
cities (i.e. all permutations)”. They conclude that NFL holds for TSP. This
confuses permutations of cities with permutations of objective values.
Several authors have found results where different algorithms win on different
problems, and claimed this as validation of or evidence for NFL. For example,
Ciuffo and Punzo [50] write that “[t]he performance of the different algorithms
over the 42 experiments considerably differ. This proves the validity of NFL
theorems in our field” (traffic simulation). Vrugt and Robinson [51] claim that
their results for several algorithms “provide numerical evidence [of NFL], show-
ing that it is impossible to develop a single search algorithm that will always
be superior to any other algorithm”. These statements are inappropriate as the
problem sets considered are far too small to be bound by NFL or SNFL and
there is no claim concerning the more refined variants FNFL and RNFL. Oltean
[14] uses evolutionary search to find problems on which one given algorithm is
out-performed by another. This helps to illustrate NFL, but is not evidence of
NFL’s truth or otherwise.
For another example, Aaronson [5] paraphrases NFL as “you can’t outper-
form brute-force search on random instances of an optimization problem”. The
phrasing is not correct: for any optimisation problem, the set of instances of
that problem is far smaller than the set of objective functions on that problem’s
search space.
Finally, Wolpert [16] writes: “the years of research into the traveling sales-
man problem (TSP) have (presumably) resulted in algorithms aligned with the
implicit P (f) describing traveling salesman problems of interest to TSP re-
searchers.” Here, P is a probability distribution over TSP problems, so this
statement is in the framework of NUNFL. But since the set of all TSP problems
is far smaller than the set of all possible problems on the same space, and is not
CUP, it is entirely possible (at least, according to NFL) for TSP researchers’
algorithms to be uniformly excellent across all TSP problems, whether in a uni-
form or any other distribution.
Of course, in FNFL and RMNFL the problem sets on which no algorithm
out-performs RS may be far smaller than the set of all possible functions or a
CUP set. But the constructions provided by Whitley and Rowe [29] (for FNFL)
and Joyce and Herrmann [10] (for RMNFL) do not lead to an easy intuition on
what problems in the focus set or restricted set are like. Any intuition that be-
cause they are smaller than the CUP set, they tend not to contain “ill-behaved”
functions is not supported by the evidence so far.
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3.4 The undefined terms “problem domain” and “problem-specific”
As already stated, a common interpretation of NFL is that “problem-specific
knowledge”, “domain knowledge” or “information on the problem class” is re-
quired to be embodied in the algorithm in order to out-perform random search.
For example, Wolpert and Macready [2] write that NFL results “indicate the
importance of incorporating problem-specific knowledge into the behavior of the
algorithm”. These statements can be easily misinterpreted, because terms such
as “problem domain” and “problem-specific” are ambiguous.
The mathematics of NFL does not deal with application domains, only prob-
lem subsets. For example, Radcliffe and Surry [15] introduce terminology with
the following phrasing: “Let D be a (proper) subset of RS (a problem “do-
main”).” Here RS is the set of all possible objective functions on the search
space R. The scare quotes around domain hint at the problem. When we read
the word “domain”, we do not think of an arbitrary subset of the set of all possi-
ble objective functions: we think of an application domain, i.e. a set of problems
in a particular application area, such as vehicle routing problems, or bioinfor-
matics. It is better to avoid the term “domain knowledge” and think instead of a
term like “problem subset knowledge”, to avoid smuggling in false connotations.
Thus we may say that to out-perform random search on a subset of all possible
problems, we require knowledge of that subset.
“Problem subset knowledge” must mean something like “knowledge that a
given property holds for problems in the subset, but not for problems outside
it”. In particular, “problem-specific knowledge” might be taken to mean that the
property in question is true only for that problem and no others. For example, Ho
and Pepyne [3] write that: “the only way one strategy can outperform another is
if it is specialized to the specific problem under consideration” (emphasis added).
But a hill-climber out-performs random search on the Onemax problem, and no-
one would say that hill-climbing is specialized only to Onemax, or that it takes
advantage of some property of Onemax which is not true of any other problem.
More broadly, it is possible to out-perform random search on a problem subset
on average by taking advantage of a property which is common but not universal
in that subset. Of course, as Wolpert and Macready [2] write, it is not enough
for the creator of an algorithm to be aware of any such property – it must be
embodied in the algorithm. Exactly what types of knowledge might be used, and
how, are discussed in Section 5.2.
3.5 Tailoring the algorithm to the problem
“Hammers contain information about the distribution of nail-driving problems”
– English [52].
A common interpretation of NFL is given by Whitley and Watson [9]: al-
gorithms must be tailored to problems, and thus “the business of developing
search algorithms is one of building special-purpose methods to solve application-
specific problems.” This suggests that when we encounter new problems, we
should seek to understand their properties and design specialised algorithms
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for them. This is also the position of Wolpert and Macready [2] and Wolpert
[16]. Smith-Miles [53] argues (based on Rice [54] and on NFL) that we should
“move away from a ‘black-box’ approach to algorithm selection, and [. . . ] de-
velop greater understanding of the characteristics of the problem in order to
select the most appropriate algorithm”, recommending landscape analysis and
other methods to develop such understanding. This position represents common
and good practice, independent of NFL.
As already argued, the set of all problems on a fixed search space does not
necessarily correspond to an application domain. Neither need each application
domain correspond to a CUP set (SNFL), a focus set (FNFL), or a restricted set
(RMNFL). For example, if we observe an algorithm having better-than-random
performance on a set of VRP instances of fixed size (hence it is not a CUP set),
then there is nothing in SNFL to prevent better-than-random performance on
another set of problems on the same space, such as instances of Satisfiability
(SAT). The scenario is illustrated with respect to SNFL in Fig. 3.
+ _ =
FCUP(VRP)
VRP
+ _ =
SAT
CUP(SAT)
Fig. 3: One possible scenario for performance on a set F of problems of fixed size, not
disallowed by any NFL result. Here CUP(VRP) indicates the CUP set of a particular
VRP instance. If for any application domain its instances always occur as a proper
subset of a CUP set, then SNFL allows a single algorithm to out-perform random
search (+) on all application domains, balanced by worse-than-random (-) and equal-
to-random (=) performance within each CUP set on problems which are not of interest.
Crucially, no assumption is required here that is not already made by those
who advocate incorporating problem-specific knowledge. But the conclusion is
very different: researchers can feel free to try out existing algorithms on new
problems, and even to search for new “super algorithms” which are better than
existing algorithms averaged across all problems of interest (nevertheless, such
claims would require precise formulation and extraordinary evidence).
In fact, although it is unlikely, this scenario could already be the case with
no contradiction to NFL results, for some algorithm such as a genetic algorithm,
or stochastic hill-climbing with restarts. If so, then by NFL, these generic al-
gorithms must be already specialised to some problem subset. This sounds like
a contradiction in terms. Our crucial claim is that generic algorithms are spe-
cialised to a particular set of problems which we might characterise as problems
of interest. An algorithm can achieve better than random performance averaged
across a subset of problems (not necessarily on every single one) even if no-one
has given a formal definition for that subset, and we do not intend to attempt
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a definition of the set of problems of interest here, though we discuss one way
to think about it in Section 6. (Schumacher et al. [19] state that “all algorithms
are equally specialized”, just to different sets of functions, but this relies on
also viewing random search as specialised, by considering it as a deterministic
algorithm with the random seed as a parameter.)
The specialisation to this large, ill-defined subset has happened through intu-
ition, trial and error, theoretical understanding of the properties of the problems
of interest, and gradual matching of their properties in algorithms. Algorithms
are designed according to researchers’ intuitions, and formal and informal knowl-
edge. Meanwhile, algorithms evolve since those which seem to work well are kept
and varied, and those which do not are thrown away (algorithms not published or
re-implemented, papers not cited, or results not replicated). Despite this process
of specialisation to a problem subset, and putative better-than-random perfor-
mance, it is appropriate to call these algorithms “generic” because they are not
specialised to particular application domains such as engineering design, VRP,
planning, regression, etc., or to individual instances. We are distinguishing be-
tween a problem subset and a problem domain, as in Section 3.4.
Yuen and Zhang [55] mention that although “real-world” problems do have
properties which allow algorithms to out-perform random search, nevertheless
“the correct lesson to learn from NFL is that it is unlikely and probably impossi-
ble to find a black-box algorithm that would do well on all real world problems”.
But a theorem that proves a proposition under certain assumptions does not
provide probabilistic evidence for that proposition if the assumptions are not
fulfilled. So if there is evidence for this position, it is independent of NFL.
This section has explained several specific misunderstandings of NFL, with
speculation as to how they arise. In particular, it has clarified that generic al-
gorithms are already specialised to a problem subset and could in principle out-
perform random search on all problems of interest. As argued in Section 4, next,
there may be reason to believe that real-world problems share properties which
would allow a single algorithm to out-perform random search on all.
4 Avoiding NFL: Assumptions
Most problems in the set of “all possible functions” on a search space (as in the
original NFL), or in a CUP set (as in SNFL), have very little structure which can
be exploited by search algorithms to achieve better-than-random performance.
But most of the problems we try to solve using search algorithms do seem to
have structure. Wolpert and Macready [2] write that “the simple existence of
that structure does not justify choice of a particular algorithm; that structure
must be known and reflected directly in the choice of algorithm to serve as such
a justification.” In contrast, Loshchilov and Glasmachers [56] write that “[i]t is
NOT the idea of black box optimization to solve problems without structure, but
rather to perform well when structure is present but unknown.” Finally, Krawiec
and Wieloch [57] write of a “quest for properties that are common for the real-
world problems (or some classes of them) and that may be exploited in the search
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process [. . . ]. Examples of such properties studied in the past include fitness-
distance correlation, unimodality of the fitness landscape, and modularity”.
An algorithm must be specialised to a subset of problems (not a “problem
domain”, as discussed in Section 3.4), taking advantage of properties of that
subset, in order to out-perform random search on it. Contrary to Wolpert and
Macready [2] and Sewell and Shawe-Taylor [39] it is not necessary to know or
state the properties in question: an algorithm will perform as well as it performs,
no matter what the user knows or states. Many users of generic algorithms which
are specialised to problem subsets achieve good results without being capable
of stating the structural properties of their objective functions. Indeed many
designers of successful generic algorithms have not stated such properties either.
The types of problems we wish to optimise using black-box methods have
structure which can be formalised in several ways. Well-known algorithms are
already specialised to such structure: thanks to NFL, we can simply define that
an algorithm is specialised to a subset of problems if it out-performs random
search on that subset. However, identifying the type of structure present in a
set of functions, and just how an algorithm is matched to that set, is the goal of
this section. In each of the following sub-sections, a different simple property is
described which, if it holds across a set of functions, shows that that set is not
CUP, allowing an algorithm to escape SNFL. Many of the properties which will
be identified follow quickly from the proof by Igel and Toussaint [22] that a non-
trivial neighbourhood on the search space is not invariant under permutation,
hence if we assume that all problems of interest share some property defined
in terms of neighbourhoods then the set of problems of interest is not CUP. In
several cases, it is also identified how well-known algorithms exploit the structure
being discussed. As argued in Section 2.9, NFL refinements including FNFL
and RMNFL do not add any practical constraint on algorithm performance to
the picture already provided by SNFL, so escaping SNFL (and thus also the
original NFL) is sufficient. In a sense, this section responds to Christensen and
Oppacher [58], who use one definition for problem structure, but invite the reader
to operationalise other definitions and use them in the same way.
Problems have their “natural” structure only when we use a natural rep-
resentation. For example, on the space of bitstrings, the Onemax problem has
strong structure when we use bit-flip as the neighbourhood operator. We could
instead define a different operator, destroying the structure and making One-
max a difficult problem for typical algorithms. Similarly, any problem can be
converted into something very similar to Onemax by hand-crafting the neigh-
bourhood operator. In both cases, such an operator would require a complex
description relative to that of the bit-flip operator. This suggests that we could
formalise the idea of a “natural” representation in complexity terms, and hints
at a duality between complexity of objective functions [17, 59, 25, 29] and com-
plexity of operators. However, further development of this idea is considered
out of scope. In the following discussion, it will be assumed that problems are
encoded in natural ways.
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The properties we will list are alternatives, i.e. to evade NFL, only one prop-
erty needs to hold, not all. The properties are not all equivalent, in that one may
hold, but not another; but more often, a problem has several. However, observing
one of these properties in one problem instance is clearly not enough to conclude
that it is present in all problems of interest. Instead it is necessary either to show
that the property holds for all considered problems or, as remarked by Joyce and
Herrmann [10], to show it for some and to argue that they are representative.
4.1 Locality
Strictly speaking, a function is said to have the property of locality if it always
maps neighbours to neighbours, for suitable definitions of neighbourhood in both
the domain and range. A looser idea of locality is common in metaheuristics
research: we say that an objective function has locality if neighbouring points in
the search space have similar objective values. One way to write this is:
E
x∈X
|f(x)− f(N(x))| < E
x,y∈X
|f(x)− f(y)|
where N is a neighbour function and X is the search space. That is, the objective
value of a pair of neighbours is more similar than the objective value of a pair of
randomly-chosen points. A correlation or scatterplot between f(x) and f(N(x))
will reveal the presence or absence of such structure in one problem.
If a set of functions have this property, then the set is not CUP, as demon-
strated by Streeter [25]. Moreover, this property directly justifies the use of a
neighbourhood (mutation) operator in an algorithm on this set. Observing this
statistical property, and choosing to use an algorithm with a neighbourhood
operator, amounts to tailoring the algorithm to the problem.
The same idea can be extended to two or more steps of a neighbourhood
operator. A correlation between f(x) and the objective value of the “neighbour
of a neighbour” f(N(N(x))) also reveals structure on the search space. An al-
gorithm which uses a neighbourhood operator but allows for worsening moves,
such as simulated annealing, might be said to exploit such structure.
The analogous property for a crossover operator can be formalised as:
E
x,y∈X
|f(x)− f(C(x, y))| < E
x,y∈X
|f(x)− f(y)|
where C is a crossover operator returning one offspring. Again, Streeter [25]
shows that with this property, a problem subset is not CUP. This property
justifies the use of an algorithm with a crossover operator: such an algorithm is
tailored to the problem subset. A genetic algorithm is thus already tailored to
the (very large) set of problems with these locality properties [60].
4.2 No maximal steepness
An objective function has the property of no maximal steepness if the largest
function difference between a pair of neighbours is less than the largest possible
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function difference. That is:
max
x∈X,N(x)
|f(x)− f(N(x))| < max
x,y∈X
|f(x)− f(y)|
where maxN(x) is seen as returning the maximum over all neighbours of x.
Given any function, permutation of objective values can give a function
achieving maximal steepness, so this property shows that a set of functions
with this property is not CUP [22, 20]. Jiang and Chen [61] name such functions
discrete-Lipschitz, by analogy with Lipschitz continuity on real-valued functions,
and use the result to demonstrate cases in which NFL does not apply. Again,
any algorithm that uses a neighbourhood concept is taking direct advantage of
this “problem knowledge”.
4.3 Fitness distance correlation
Fitness distance correlation (FDC) [62] measures the correlation between d(x, x∗)
and f(x), where x∗ is the optimum point, x is an arbitrary point, and d is a
distance. In a minimisation problem, large positive FDC values tend to indi-
cate easier problems and large negative values difficult or deceptive problems
(though counter-examples exist). FDC is thus a measure of a type of structure
in a problem. It can be seen as a “multi-step” generalisation of locality.
Given a problem with positive FDC, permutation of objective values can
produce a problem with negative FDC. This is easy to see by picturing a plot of
objective value against distance (a line of best fit through this data must have a
positive slope). By permuting objective values other than that of the optimum
we can achieve a negative slope. Thus, a set of functions all with positive FDC
is not CUP. An algorithm that tends to visit new points close (in d) to good
points is tailored to a subset with positive FDC.
The statistic proposed by Christensen and Oppacher [58] has something of the
same meaning as FDC. It is large when for many points, the point’s objective
value ranking is the same as its distance ranking. They propose to threshold
functions according to this statistic: functions with values above a threshold have
structure, and the set of such functions is not CUP. Moreover, they propose an
algorithm which directly exploits this type of structure.
4.4 Constraints and penalty functions
Kimbrough et al. [63] consider NFL in the context of problems with constraints.
One common approach when using metaheuristics is to add a penalty term for
constraint violations to the objective function. Kimbrough et al. show that if the
original objective f is drawn from a CUP set, but the penalty term g is fixed
and can take on at least two values (e.g. at least one feasible and one infeasible
point exist), then the composite objective f − λg is not CUP.
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4.5 Number of local optima
Unimodality is the property that a function has only a single (global) optimum.
This is a strong structure which tends to make problems easy. A set of unimodal
functions is not CUP, and an algorithm which uses a local neighbourhood op-
erator is specialised to such a set. Igel and Toussaint [20] also show that if the
maximum possible number of local optima in the space is not achieved by any
of the functions in a subset, then the subset is not CUP. A generalisation is
possible3: if any fixed number of local optima (not necessarily the maximum) is
not achieved by any function in the set, then it is not CUP. Even a subset of
problems which includes no unimodal function is not CUP. However, it seems
difficult to describe how an algorithm can be matched to these properties.
4.6 Modularity
Modularity is the property that candidate solutions can be consistently broken
down into parts, each of whose contribution to the objective function is to some
extent independent of that of others. Krawiec and Wieloch [57] propose a mea-
sure for modularity which depends on the degree of monotonicity of a module’s
contribution to the objective. Given a problem with some degree of modular-
ity, permutation of objective values can remove modularity, since it can remove
monotonicity. Therefore, a set of functions each with high modularity is not
CUP. An algorithm which implements a variation operator by varying just one
component of the candidate at a time (e.g. a neighbourhood operator which
alters just one variable in a real vector) is aiming to exploit such modularity.
4.7 Bounded time complexity and bounded description length
We conclude this section with two types of assumption on problem structure
which have sometimes been proposed as methods of escaping NFL, but which
do not quite work: bounded time complexity and bounded description length.
In the set of all objective functions, only a very small proportion of them can
run in reasonable time [17, 59]. Objective functions which require unreasonably
long execution time are not realistic candidates for optimisation, regardless of
what performance would in principle be. Therefore, we may assume that we will
attempt to optimise functions which run in bounded time, and this assumption
means our set of functions is much less than the set of all possible functions.
Streeter [25] also argues in this direction. However, this argument seems suffi-
cient only to escape the original NFL, not SNFL or other refinements, since the
counting argument used by [17, 59] considers all possible functions.
In algorithmic information theory, the description length of an object is the
length of the shortest encoding for that object. A function is compressible if it
has a description length shorter than that of a lookup table.
Streeter [25] shows that an NFL result does not hold on a set of functions if
the functions’ description length is “sufficiently bounded”. However, this turns
3 Due to an anonymous reviewer.
When and Why Metaheuristics Researchers Can Ignore NFL 21
out not to be good enough for our purposes. Whitley and Rowe [64] point out
that “there is a subset of problems where Best-First local search is likely to be a
useful search method. But there is a corresponding set of functions where Worst-
First local search is equally effective. What do these functions look like? They
probably are not random, but rather ‘structured’ in some sense”. That is, they
have bounded description length. This is because if they were incompressible,
Worst-First could not do any better than Random Search.
To help us picture such functions, we can use a trap construction: given a
“nice” real-world function f on which Best-First search does well, define f ′ as
f ′(x) = f(x), except for a global optimum x+ and a global “pessimum” x−,
whose objective values are swapped: f ′(x+) = f(x−) and vice versa. On the
“trap” function f ′ a Worst-First searcher can be expected to do well. f ′ is not
much less compressible than f . Importantly, the set {f, f ′} is not CUP, but
performance of Best-First and Worst-First algorithms will be equal on it. Thus,
observing bounded description length on a set of problems evades NFL itself,
but now the “almost no free lunch” (ANFL) theorem constrains performance.
ANFL [12] shows that assuming low complexity in the problems of interest is not
sufficient: for every problem f1 where our algorithm A out-performs RS, there
is another f2 of similar complexity where RS out-performs A [10] .
Droste et al. [59] give a more rigorous treatment on constructing these dif-
ficult, but not unstructured problems. Although bounded time complexity or
description length do not escape NFL results, the nature of their construction,
and of the inversion example above, may give us comfort that we will not en-
counter such functions as real problems very often.
This section has examined abstract structure which may be present in prob-
lems. Next, several concrete NFL counter-examples are demonstrated.
5 Avoiding NFL: Examples
In this section mechanisms and strategies for avoiding NFL are demonstrated
by example. Several are well-known as corollaries to previous work: our goal is
to walk through the reasoning.
5.1 MAX-2-SAT is not CUP
Whitley and Rowe [29] remark that previous work by Igel and Toussaint [22]
and by Streeter [25] has shown that MAX-SAT is not CUP; however the result
is not stated explicitly. We will present a MAX-2-SAT problem whose objective
value-permutation is not a MAX-2-SAT problem, showing that MAX-2-SAT is
not CUP. Let us consider the search space of n = 3 variables and the instance
defined by the formula φ = (x0∨x1). We will order points in the search space in
the natural way, and for each calculate its objective value, giving an objective
table as shown in Table 1.
We now permute the objective values to (0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1). We will see that
the latter cannot arise as the MAX-2-SAT objective-value table of any formula
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Table 1: Objective-value table for MAX-2-SAT with n = 3 and the formula φ =
(x0 ∨ x1). f(x) is the number of clauses of φ satisfied by x.
x0 x1 x2 f(x)
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1
φ′ on the same number of variables (not necessarily the same number of clauses).
The first entry (0, 0, 0 → 0) implies that φ′ contains no clauses featuring ¬x0,
¬x1, or ¬x2 whatsoever; the last entry (1, 1, 1→ 1) implies that φ′ contains no
more than one clause featuring any of x0, x1, x2. Together, these imply that
the formula must consist of a single clause, composed of xi variables only (no
negations). Therefore there are only three possibilities: φ′ = x0∨x1, φ′ = x0∨x2,
or φ′ = x1 ∨ x2. None of these match the rest of the table. Therefore, no such φ′
exists, and so the set of MAX-2-SAT problems on 3 variables is not CUP.
It is interesting to see that MAX-2-SAT achieves maximal steepness (see
Section 4). For example, in the 4-variable problem defined by the target formula
(x0∨x1)∧(x0∨x2)∧(x0∨x3), the minimum objective value is 0 and the maximum
is 3, and the two neighbours (0, 0, 0, 0) and (1, 0, 0, 0) achieve these values.
As discussed in Section 4, if a problem does not achieve maximal steepness,
then it must not be CUP. MAX-2-SAT does achieve maximal steepness, but as
presented here, a different argument shows that it is still not CUP. Thus, there
may be multiple routes to showing that SNFL does not apply.
5.2 TSP is not CUP
Koehler [23] prove, using the idea of circulant matrices, that symmetric TSP is
not CUP. Jiang and Chen [61] show that TSP instances are discrete-Lipschitz,
and thus not CUP (see Section 4.2). We wish to go further by constructing a
concrete counter-example, that is a TSP which, when its objective values are
permuted, is not a TSP – showing that SNFL does not apply to TSP. Note that
although the following example takes advantage of the fact that the problem is
not black-box, in order to construct a counter-example to NFL, it is not avoiding
NFL by using a non-black box algorithm.
Figure 4 shows a TSP problem on 6 cities. The best tour x = (123456) has
f(x) = 6; the worst x′ = (142536) has f(x′) = 32. To construct a counter-
example we permute the objective value of the best and worst solutions, that is
we let f(x) = 32 and f(x′) = 6, and show that the resulting f is not a TSP.
The idea we are trying to exploit is that in many problems, the neighbours of
the optimum are likely quite good, and similarly the neighbours of the worst
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0 1 2 9 2 1
1 0 1 2 9 2
2 1 0 1 2 9
9 2 1 0 1 2
2 9 2 1 0 1
1 2 9 2 1 0

Fig. 4: A non-geometric TSP instance shown graphically and as a cost matrix.
individual in the space are likely to be bad. This is an approximate paraphrase
of the main idea of maximal steepness. We observe that in the new problem,
the worst individual x = (123456) has objective value 32 and has 6 neighbours
under 2-opt mutation, all with objective value 8, e.g. f(123465) = 8. Is there any
cost matrix that could give a problem with these objective values? We designate
the new, unknown cost matrix as C. These properties give us 7 simultaneous
equations in the coefficients Cij :
C12 + C23 + C34 + C45 + C56 + C61 = 32
C12 + C23 + C34 + C46 + C65 + C51 = 8
C12 + C23 + C35 + C54 + C46 + C61 = 8
C12 + C24 + C43 + C35 + C56 + C61 = 8
C13 + C32 + C24 + C45 + C56 + C61 = 8
C13 + C34 + C45 + C56 + C62 + C21 = 8
C16 + C62 + C23 + C34 + C45 + C51 = 8
Using manual methods or a computer algebra system (a link to code is given
later) we will see that these equations have no solution. Thus, TSP on 7 cities is
not CUP. It is the physical structure of the problem – the objective is the sum
of inter-city distances – that escapes NFL.
5.3 Symbolic Regression is not CUP
Poli et al. [38] use a nice geometric argument to show that genetic program-
ming symbolic regression (GPSR) is not CUP, that is that permuting fitness
values of a GPSR problem can give a new problem which is not an instance of
GPSR. Although GPSR is a supervised machine learning method, here we are
discussing NFL for search and optimisation, which is about search (training)
performance only, rather than NFL for supervised machine learning, which is
about performance on unseen data only.
The argument is briefly summarised in Fig. 5. It takes advantage of the fact
that GPSR is not really a black-box problem: instead, the objective function is
a function of a sum over partial objectives, one per item in the training data.
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p1
p2
p3
d(t, p1)
t
d(t, p1)
Fig. 5: Symbolic regression is not CUP, as shown by Poli et al. [38]. Left: a GPSR
problem in semantic space. Each axis indicates program output on one objective func-
tion case. Points pi indicate semantics of various programs. The objective function is
RMSE, i.e. Euclidean distance in semantic space from the target semantics t. Centre: t
is at the intersection of hyperspheres with centres pi and radii f(pi) = d(t, pi). Right:
after permutation of objective values among programs, there is no such intersection,
so the problem is not a symbolic regression problem for any target semantics t.
Another issue relevant to NFL and GPSR is duplicated semantics. Consider
any space which includes the two functions (* x 2) and (+ x x), where x is a
variable, and includes other functions also. These two functions are distinct items
in the search space, so under permutation they can get distinct objective values.
But if these two trees, which are semantically identical, get distinct objective
values, then the objective function is not symbolic regression. Therefore the
set of SR problems on a fixed search space is not CUP. It is not that over-
representation (multiple programs with the same semantics) is a technique that
helps GP to perform well: rather, it just means that SNFL does not apply.
5.4 Boolean genetic programming is not CUP
A similar argument can be made for Boolean genetic programming, for example,
where now target semantics is a binary vector, and d is Hamming distance.
Although the argument is similar, distance on the page does not give a reliable
intuition for d, so a concrete example is worthwhile. With two variables x0 and
x1, we can define example programs such as p0(x) = x0 ∧ x1, p1(x) = x0 ∨ x1,
and p2(x) = ¬x0. Taking a target semantics t = (0, 0, 0, 1), our programs receive
objective values f(p0) = 4 (because p0 = x0 ∧ x1 has exactly the semantics
(0, 0, 0, 1)), f(p1) = 2, f(p2) = 1, which we write as just (4, 2, 1). Permuting
these objective values to e.g. (4, 1, 2), we find there is no target semantics t
which would give these three programs these three objective values.
Code for exploring these examples (TSP, MAXSAT, and Boolean GP) is
available from https://github.com/jmmcd/NFL.
6 The Anthropic Principle and NFL
In the previous two sections we have given several specific mechanisms by which
researchers can “escape” NFL results. However, this paper is arguing for a
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stronger position: researchers can in many common situations ignore NFL with-
out specific, per-paper justification. In this section, we broaden the discussion to
include “the other NFL”, NFL for machine learning (NFLML). We then consider
both together and propose an a priori assumption which justifies ignoring NFL
in many common situations.
NFLML [7] states that any two supervised machine learning algorithms
achieve the same performance on unseen data, averaged over all possible prob-
lems. It has a very similar flavour to NFL for search and optimisation, but was
less controversial in its field, perhaps partly because the ideas had been more
anticipated. Schaffer [65] proved the central result, but did not use the NFL
nickname. Both NFL for search and optimisation and NFLML may be said to
have roots in the “algorithm selection problem” posed by Rice [54], on which
research continues, e.g. considering a meta-learning approach [53].
Schaffer [65] comments on a common attitude concerning NFLML, that it
is “theoretically sound, but practically irrelevant”. The position is summed up
by Domingos [66] in comments which echo those often made concerning NFL
for optimisation: “very general assumptions – like smoothness, similar examples
having similar classes, limited dependences, or limited complexity – are often
enough to do very well”. However, Schaffer [65] also cites real-world examples
in which ML algorithms have indeed performed worse than random on unseen
data. Such cases have been observed also in NFL for search and optimisation.
However, in both cases the same evidence – worse than random performance –
can arise even in cases where NFL does not strictly apply.
Researchers sometimes misunderstand NFLML in a similar way to NFL, for
example Smith-Miles [53] states that the StatLog project “confirmed that no
single algorithm performed best for all problems, as supported by the [NFLML]
theorem”, even though no NFLML result can apply to the set of problems men-
tioned. The distinction between problem subsets and application domains is often
blurred in the context of NFLML, just as in NFL for search and optimisation
(see Section 3.4), for example in the NFL discussion in Murphy [67], p. 24.
Schaffer also pointed out that NFLML is a formalisation of the basic prob-
lem of induction – drawing any generalisation from observed data is impossible
without an additional assumption or bias – and dates this to Hume [68]. In fact,
according to Sewell and Shawe-Taylor [39], NFLML “formalizes Hume, extends
him and calls all of science into question”. We cannot learn (in the machine learn-
ing sense, or in the scientific sense of proceeding from observations to principles
and predictions, or even in the everyday sense) without a suitable bias, and it
is claimed that there is no a priori justification for choosing any bias. Serafino
[33] also links NFL for search and optimisation to the problem of induction.
And yet, our learning algorithms do learn. The reasons that these types
of learning work (despite Hume and NFLML) and metaheuristic search works
(despite NFL for search and optimisation) are really the same reason, and we
now suggest that the real value of NFL is that it forces us to identify that reason.
More specifically, why do the problems which seem to commonly arise have the
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property that simple, generic algorithms can out-perform random search, even
though such problems are a tiny fraction of the possible problems?
Our universe runs on fairly simple rules. “[T]he class of functions of practical
interest can be approximated through ‘cheap learning’ with exponentially fewer
parameters than generic ones, because they have simplifying properties tracing
back to the laws of physics. The exceptional simplicity of physics-based functions
hinges on properties such as symmetry, locality, compositionality and polyno-
mial log-probability” [69]. This comment was made in the context of supervised
learning-type functions, but the reasoning holds for optimisation objective func-
tions also. If the universe is simple and rule-bound, so that unseen data is in some
way similar to training data, then the processes that generate fitness landscapes
on real problems will usually be simple and rule-bound too.
Even if we do not know physical laws precisely, we know them approximately,
and this is sufficient to know that our universe has exploitable structure. As
stated by Hutter [6], “The assumption that the world has some structure is as
safe as (or I think even weaker than) the assumption that e.g. classical logic is
good for reasoning about the world”. So we may ask: what would a universe
without exploitable structure look like? Wolpert [16] describes a scenario (two
professors competing to produce good ML algorithms) which illustrates it. In a
universe without structure, no amount of evidence in favour of one professor’s
algorithms could justify betting that that professor would continue to be the
best. Wolpert [16] argues that to resolve this, and generally to justify proceeding
from evidence to predictions, it is required to make an assumption about the
“probability distribution over universes”, which cannot be justified a priori.
However, there is a well-known position, not previously considered in this
context, which justifies exactly such an assumption: the anthropic principle. It
states that “the Universe (and hence the fundamental parameters on which it
depends) must be such as to admit within it the creation of observers within
it.”[70, p. 294]. If it were not, observers would not be here to observe otherwise.
Any intelligent organism makes predictions about the future and seeks to act
on them; any behavioural organism acts on the basis of implicit predictions about
the future; and any organism at all embodies an implicit prediction about the
environment it will find itself in. If these predictions are systematically wrong,
these organisms are less likely to survive, propagate, and evolve. Any organism
requires on some robustness in these things, since there will always be noise
in the genetic copying procedure and in the environment sufficient to make the
outcome differ from the ideal. We are assuming here that organisms arise through
evolutionary processes involving selection and a copying procedure which leads to
variation. Ha¨ggstro¨m [4] remarks that the type of search landscape we observe
in biology is highly “clustered” or auto-correlated – a single mutation in the
DNA of a surviving, reproducing organism does not (in expectation) result in
an outcome as bad as generating DNA uniformly from scratch. One aspect of the
explanation for this is that gene interactions are not so strong as to overwhelm an
overall additive behaviour of fitness in response to genes [71]. If biological search
landscapes were not structured, then evolution would not work at all: intelligent
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life could not arise. The professors of Wolpert’s scenario cannot evolve to exist
in the universe he describes.
Mendes et al. [72] wonders whether structured problems turn out to be com-
mon just because the universe is rule-bound, or because they are salient (i.e., of
interest) to observers. In fact these possibilities are really the same possibility,
since as argued observers evolve to take advantage of the rules of the universe.
Solomonoff induction [73] similarly allows for a principled approach to in-
duction (justifying scientific enquiry and machine learning, contra Hume and
NFLML) by assuming that processes governed by short Turing machines are
more likely to occur (e.g. as ML problems) than ones governed by long ones.
This assumption is justified a priori by the anthropic principle.
Thus, the anthropic principle gives us an a priori assumption about the
distribution of universes we could find ourselves in, which allows us to escape
NFL: we can assume that our problems of interest are ones which arise and are
salient to observers in a rule-bound universe. Everyday learning works, science
works, supervised learning works, and metaheuristic search works, because we
are here.
7 Conclusions
We have observed a collection of evidence that NFL is often misunderstood in
the literature. In response we have stated several sets of accessible arguments,
both new and old. We have argued against one common position on NFL –
that in order to out-perform random search, algorithms need to be intentionally
tailored to specific problems – and for the position that the anthropic principle
justifies a priori ignoring NFL in many common situations.
Many of the practical lessons sometimes stated to follow from NFL are in
fact independent of it, but may still represent excellent advice:
– There probably isn’t one algorithm that wins on all real-world problems.
As argued in Section 3.5, NFL allows the scenario that one algorithm (even
one already in existence) is better than random search on all real-world
problems. But empirical evidence is obviously against it. It seems likely that
researchers will remain in “full employment” [74] for now.
– Specialising an algorithm with domain-specific or problem subset knowledge
often helps. “[A]pplying a general purpose ‘black box’ search algorithm is
wasteful” [56]. Among many others, Bonissone et al. [75] argue for this po-
sition using both NFL reasons and NFL-independent examples.
– Random search is often a worthwhile baseline, not least because it is simple
to implement. Out-performing it seems essential for a publishable result.
This remains true even where NFL is known not to apply.
We have not yet seen any example of a set of objective functions which arise
as real-world problems and which are either “all possible objective functions”
for a given search space, or are closed under permutation. Neither have we seen
a similar example of a focus set (FNFL) or restricted set (RMNFL). Therefore,
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the evidence of decades of research suggests that the burden of proof is on those
who claim that NFL has practical relevance. To be specific: when and why can
researchers ignore NFL?
A researcher may observe better than random performance of an algorithm
on a set of test problems in a real-world problem domain, and wish to draw a
conclusion about performance on new problems of the same or different sizes, or
drawn from different problem domains. As discussed in Section 3, NFL can be
ignored, but a claim that performance will generalise still requires support.
It is unlikely that a researcher will specifically wish to make a claim about
algorithm performance averaged over the set of all possible problems on a space
(original NFL), a CUP set (SNFL), focus set (FNFL) or restricted set (RMNFL),
but clearly in such a case NFL cannot be ignored and no improvement over
random search is possible.
When a researcher can state an assumption on the structure of their problem
of the type discussed in Section 4, or follow a template like those in Section 5,
then NFL will not constrain algorithm performance, but of course in doing so
the researcher is taking account of NFL, not ignoring it.
A researcher may prefer not to deal with such assumptions per-problem. The
anthropic principle (as discussed in Section 6) justifies an assumption that struc-
ture (often of the types identified in Section 4) will be present across sufficiently
many of the problems of interest for generic, well-known algorithms to be suffi-
ciently specialised (as discussed in Section 3) to out-perform random search on
average. As long as a researcher restricts attention to problems of interest they
can use the anthropic principle and ignore NFL.
A researcher may wish to aim for a “super algorithm”, one that is better than
random on all real-world problems. A researcher may even hope that an existing
algorithm is such a super algorithm. Although it seems unlikely, no NFL result
prevents this and such a researcher can ignore NFL. A researcher who wishes for
a “super algorithm” better than random on all problems is thwarted by NFL.
Of course, nothing in this paper is intended to suggest that researchers can
simply assume good performance, or good generalisation. Neither should re-
searchers take advantage of any NFL discussion to reinvent old algorithms dis-
guised by novel metaphors and supported by dubious experimental evidence –
the type of behaviour identified by So¨rensen [43] and Weyland [44].
For future work, probably the biggest genuine research gaps for those fo-
cussing on NFL itself are (1) characterisation of the focus sets and restricted
sets of FNFL and RMNFL and variants, (2) further study of how exactly as-
sumptions of structure present in problems are embodied in new and existing
algorithms, and (3) further characterisation of the grey area beyond what are
currently known to be problems of interest.
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